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Abstract—This paper introduces a cyber insurance policy
management for the mobile networks in which if a mobile user
agrees to purchase an insurance policy from an insurer, the loss of
the mobile user, i.e., the insured, will be covered by the insurance
policy when the risks happen. To protect mobile users from cyber
attacks, the insurer can deploy security protection solutions,
e.g., anti-virus software or personal firewall, to the insureds,
thereby reducing the risks for mobile users. However, when the
solutions are deployed, they will incur a certain cost to the insurer.
Therefore, we propose a stochastic optimization based on the
reserve state of the insurer and the number of active mobile users
to determine whether the protection solutions should be deployed
or not to maximize the revenue for the insurer. The performance
evaluation reveals that the optimal policy can achieve significantly
higher revenue than those of baseline schemes for the insurer.
Alternatively, the coalitional game is studied to share the reward
among the insurers, and we show that the insurers can gain
higher individual rewards through the cooperation.
Index Terms—Cyber insurance, cyber security, risk manage-
ment, MDP, coalitional game, wireless attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber security is a paramount issue in wireless communi-
cations and mobile networking. Various types of attacks and
risks arise in wireless systems and mobile services including
denial-of-service (e.g., jamming attack) and eavesdropping in
the physical layer, MAC spoofing and network injection in
the MAC layer, IP spoofing and IP hijacking in the network
layer, TCP and UDP flooding in the transport layer, and
malware and SMTP attacks in the application layer. Although
a number of advanced security solutions for wireless systems
and mobile networks have been introduced [1], achieving com-
plete security protection is still nearly impossible. Therefore,
cyber insurance has emerged as an alternative approach to
address and manage cyber risks for mobile networks [2]. In
particular, when a mobile user agrees to purchase a cyber
insurance contract offered by an insurer, the user will receive
the protection from the insurer. Thus, the mobile user’s risks
can be “transferred” to the insurer, and the insurer can profit
from the premium and efficient risk management solutions.
To explore the full potential of cyber risk management,
the security protection and cyber insurance should be com-
bined [3]. However, due to the moral-hazard effect, the users
may recklessly ignore adopting necessary security protection
as the users may rely on the cyber insurance. However, in
fact, the studies, e.g., [3], showed that there is a balance
between employing proper security protection and obtaining
cyber insurance policy. As such, the insurer may provide
security protection solutions, e.g., intrusion prevention, to the
users which buy its cyber insurance product. The security
protection will reduce the chance of successful attacks and
consequently curtail the claims paid to the affected users.
This paper studies the aforementioned issue in which an
insurer will decide to deploy/not to deploy security protection
solutions to the mobile users which subscribe to the cyber
insurance policy. The objective is to maximize the revenue for
the insurer, and thus the insurer has to manage its reserve
(money) efficiently. The reserve dynamic depends on the
incoming premium paid by the mobile users, and outgoing
claims paid back to the users if attacks happen to them. Addi-
tionally, if the insurer decides to deploy a security protection
solution, the cost is bonded to the reserve. The insurer has to
ensure that there is enough reserve for the payment. Otherwise,
it has to borrow from an external institution which incurs
a certain cost. On the contrary, if the reserve is high, the
insurer can invest and receive a certain return. To optimally
manage the reserve, we introduce an optimization based on
a Markov decision process (MDP) to decide the action to
deploy the security protection or not. Moreover, we consider
a scenario in which multiple insurers can cooperate to share
the reserve, cost, and return of the investment. The solution
concept from the coalitional game is applied to share the
reward. The numerical results show that the optimization and
cooperation yield clear benefits to the insurers.
II. RELATED WORK
In [3], a security-as-a-service framework with cyber insur-
ance policies was introduced to allocate security services and
manage risks simultaneously for cloud customers. The main
objective of this framework is to mitigate the risks, while
minimizing the total cost from purchasing security services
and cyber insurance policy for the cloud customers. In [4],
the authors introduced a cost-aware hierarchical cyber incident
analytic framework to help enterprises reduce the cost of cyber
insurance without lowing down the level of digital security
guarantees. The idea of this paper is to combine business tools
with big data techniques to create a classified hierarchy that
can distinguish and identify risks and their solutions and costs.
In [5], the authors adopted an insurance model to improve
spectrum efficiency in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In
this model, the primary users (PUs) are spectrum sellers (in-
surers), while the secondary users (SUs) are buyers (insureds).
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Given the insurance policies offered by PUs, the SUs have
to decide to simply purchase a channel or meanwhile sign
an insurance contract with the PUs to cover the potential
accidents, e.g., jamming attacks. Simulations results demon-
strated that the utilities of SUs under low risk and high risk
will be improved approximately 4.6% and 23.5%, respectively.
Extended from [5], the authors in [6] introduced an idea
of using a joint insurance pool established by the PUs to
protect themselves against accidental and unpredictable loss,
or provide a temporary respite from stagnation. It was shown
that partial absorption of the large losses can be achieved due
to enhanced cooperation level among PUs.
In [7], an economic model based on cyber insurance was
proposed to maximize revenue for plug-in electric vehicles
(PEVs) in vehicle-to-grid (V2G) systems. In V2G networks,
V2G system information is not always available, and thus the
PEVs may be unable to achieve the best charging/discharging
performance. Therefore, an insurance policy together with an
optimization algorithm was proposed to find optimal decisions
for the PEVs in charging and purchasing insurance. Simulation
results reveal that cyber insurance is an efficient approach
in dealing with cyber risks and maximizing revenue for the
PEVs. In [8], the authors introduced a bi-level game-theoretic
framework for studying an application of cyber insurance to
computer networks. This framework provides an integrative
view of the cyber insurance and enables a systematic design
of incentive compatible and attack-aware insurance policy.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first which
proposes a novel software security-bundled cyber insurance
model to protect mobile users from cyber attacks. Moreover,
unlike the aforementioned and other works in the literature,
we introduce a new idea of using the reserve obtained by
premium for other business activities to invest and earn an
extra profit. We also develop an MDP framework to find an
optimal insurance strategy for the insurer.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cyber insurer selling an insurance policy to
a set of mobile users in a wireless network (Fig. 1). The user
arrival rate is λ per minute, and the active user remains in
the network for µ minutes on average. The maximum number
of active users in the network is denoted by N . The users in
the network are vulnerable to cyber attacks from attackers. A
user buys the insurance policy from the insurer by paying a
premium denoted by p monetary units (MUs) per time period.
Hence, the user is the insured. If the attack happens to the
user, the insurer will pay a fixed claim with the amount of c
MUs to the attacked user. Intrusion detection can be employed
to monitor and detect such attacks [9].
The insurer may decide to offer a protection software solu-
tion, e.g., malware scan, to the users which buy the insurance
policy. Without the protection, the probability that the attacker
successfully attacks a user is denoted by γno, and it is γpr
with the protection solution in which γno > γpr. If the insurer










Fig. 1. System model.
has a (cash) reserve for accumulating the premium from the
users and paying claims and covering the protection solution.
If the reserve is insufficient to pay the claim, the insurer has
to borrow money from external institution which costs the
insurer b > 1 MUs per one MU that the insurer borrows. On
the contrary, the insurer has a long-term investment plan in
which if the reserve is higher than a certain threshold R, the
insurer will invest the excess reserve which yields v > 1 MUs
per one MU that the insurer invests.
IV. OPTIMIZATION FORMULATION
We formulate the decision making of the insurer as a








where R is the reserve state which can take a value between
zero and the maximum reserve threshold R, and N is the
number of active users which can take a value between zero
and the maximum number of users N . The action space is
defined as follows ∆ = {0, 1}, in which 0 and 1 represent
that the insurer does not and does deploy the protection to the
active user, respectively.
Let r and r′ be the current and next reserve states, respec-
tively. If the security protection is not deployed, the reserve
state change can be expressed as follows:
r′ = r − n†c+ np. (2)
The reserve increases by the premium p collected from n
active users and it decreases by the claim c paid to the n† active
users who have been attacked. However, if the protection is
deployed, the reserve state change is
r′ = r − n†c− s+ np, (3)
where s is the cost of deploying the protection. Here, if r′ < 0,
the insurer has to borrow money which will cost −br′. On the
contrary, if r′ > R, i.e., the reserve is more than the threshold
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The reserve can decrease if the attack happens. The probability









for n† ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}, where γ = γno if the protection is
deployed and γ = γpr if the protection is not deployed.
In the following, we derive the transition probability matrix
of the MDP. We first consider the number of active users,
which can thus be modeled as a Markov chain [10]. The




µ −λ− µ λ
. . . . . . . . .
(N − 1)µ −λ− (N − 1)µ λ
Nµ −Nµ
 , (5)
where each row corresponds to the number of active users n.
To convert Q to the transition probability matrix, we apply




+ I, for κ ≥ min
y
(∣∣∣[Q]y,y∣∣∣). (6)
[Q]y,y denotes the diagonal element at row y and column y
of matrix Q. In other words, κ is greater than or equal to the
absolute value of the minimum diagonal element of Q.
Next, we consider the insurer’s reserve state. The corre-
sponding transition probability P(a) is expressed as in (7) for
action a ∈ ∆. Each row of matrix P(a) represents the reserve
state. The reserve state can increase and decrease depending
on the events happening. ⊗ is the Kronecker product in which
the reserve state transition is combined with the transition of
number of active users, i.e., N. Here, β′(a) denotes the maxi-
mum decrease while β′′(a) denotes the maximum increase of
the reserve state. We have β′(a) = Nc and β′′(a) = Np when
action a = 0 is taken, i.e., no protection is deployed. On the
contrary, we have β′(a) = Nc+ s and β′′(a) = Np− s when
action a = 1 is taken, where s is the amount of reserve used
to pay for deploying the protection.
Matrix R(a)r,r′ contains the transition probability of number
of active users when the reserve state changes from r to r′.
It is obtained by combining with the transition matrix of the









denote the diagonal element of matrix R̃(a)r,r′ at row n and
column n. It is the probability that the reserve state changes
from r to r′ when the number of active users is n.
The immediate reward function of the MDP is defined as
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0 1 · · · N
]
and 1⃗ is a vector of ones.
Here, when r < 0, it incurs the borrowing cost to the insurer,
and hence b is applied to every MU of insufficient reserve.
Note that in the first and the third conditions, the summation
is over the insufficient reserve to be paid for the claim, and
hence the sign of r′ is negative.
The policy of the MDP is the mapping from state (r, n)
to action a. To obtain the optimal policy, we transform the
MDP into an equivalent linear programming (LP) problem.
Let ϕ((r, n), a) denote the steady state probability that at state
(r, n), action a is taken. The equivalent linear programming




















ϕ((r, n), a) = 1, ϕ((r, n), a) ≥ 0, (11)
where P ((r′, n′)|(r, n), a) is the probability that the current
state is (r, n) and the next state is (r′, n′) when action a is
taken. This probability is the element of matrix P(a) defined in
(7). By solving the aforementioned optimization problem (e.g.,
using MATLAB toolbox), we can find the optimal policy and
derive the average reward of the insurer.
V. INSURER COOPERATION
We consider the case that more than one insurer can
cooperate to aggregate their users and share a single pool of
reserve. The cost and return of investment are shared among
the cooperative insurers. The reward dividing is studied using
a tool from the coalitional game theory. Let I denote a set
of cooperative insurers. For all the cooperative insurers, they
have and share one reserve. The number of active users from
all insurers are treated as a single group. Therefore, the state
space of the collective insurer, i.e., a group of cooperative
insurers, adopted from (1) is denoted by
ΩI =
{





i∈I Ni and Ni is the maximum number of
active users of insurer i. Since all the cooperative insurers
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i∈I λi in which λi is the user arrival rate at
insurer i. We then follow the derivations of transition proba-
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(a)
R−β′′(a),R−β′′(a)−β′(a) · · · R
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in Section IV. With the cooperation, the reward is aggregated
for all cooperative insurers and it is denoted by WI . This
aggregated reward has to be divided among all the insurers. In
this paper, we apply the Shapley value in which the individual




|S|!(|I| − |S| − 1)!
|I|!
(WS∪{i} −WS), (14)
where S is any subset of all cooperative insurers I, and WS
is the aggregated reward of a subset of cooperative insurers.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Parameter Setting
The maximum number of users in the network is set to 10.
The arrival rate is 6 users per hour, and the connection holding
time is 20 minutes. The premium is 1 monetary unit (MU),
and the claim is 5 MUs. The maximum reserve capacity is 300
MUs. The cost of borrowing money because of insufficient
reserve is 1.07 MUs and the return of investment from extra
reserve is 1.03 MUs. The attack probability is 0.2, and the
protection success probability is 0.75.
B. Numerical Results










































Fig. 2. Policies of the insurer for (a) high success protection probability (0.5)
and (b) low success protection probability (0.25).
Figs. 2(a) and (b) show the actions taken by the insurer to
deploy the security protection solution to the active users or
not. The actions are shown according to the reserve state and
the number of active users. Clearly, the insurer will deploy
the protection only when the number of active users is large
enough. This is due to the fact that the deployment yields
higher gain than the cost. Furthermore, the insurer is more
likely to deploy the protection when the reserve state is small.
This is to avoid the risk of having insufficient reserve which
can cost the insurer more than not deploying the protection.
When the effectiveness of the protection becomes smaller, e.g.,
due to adaptive attacks, the insurer is less likely to deploy the
protection, i.e., Fig. 2(a) versus Fig. 2(b).





















Fig. 3. Distribution of reserve state.
Fig. 3 shows the distribution of reserve state of three
policies, i.e., optimal, never protect, and always protect. The
“never protect” policy results in the reserve to be empty with
high probability, costing the insurer considerably. Alterna-
tively, the “always protect” policy results in more uniform
probability of reserve state. On the contrary, the optimal policy
leads to the insurer having more reserve than the other two
policies. The reward of the optimal policy is thus higher. These
results suggest that if the security protection is appropriately
applied, the reward of the insurer can be maximized.
Clearly, when the protection success probability increases,
the insurer will be more likely to deploy the security protection
(Fig. 4(a)). Accordingly, the reward of the insurer increases
as the protection success probability increases. Nevertheless,
the impact from the protection success probability subsides
when the attack probability decreases. This is due to the fact
that when the attack happens more frequently, the insurer can
deploy the protection to reduce the amount of claim to be paid.
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Fig. 4. (a) The probability of deploying protection action and (b) the average
reward of the insurer when the protection success probability is varied.























Fig. 5. Average reward when the user arrival rate is varied.
In Fig. 5, when the user arrival rate increases, the average
reward increases as the insurer can generate more reward
from selling the insurance policy. Again, the proposed op-
timal policy yields the highest reward. Next, we consider
two insurers with and without cooperation. Their average
individual rewards are shown in Fig. 6 in which the user arrival
rate of insurer 2 is varied while that of insurer 1 is fixed.
With cooperation, two insurers share their reserves, and their
revenue and cost are also divided, i.e., using the Shapley value.
There are two important observations in Fig. 6. First, when
two insurers cooperate, they achieve the average individual
reward larger than that without the cooperation. Second, with
cooperation even when insurer 1 has fixed arrival rate of users,
it still gains higher reward when the user arrival rate of insurer
2 increases. Evidently, there is a benefit of cooperation among
insurers.
VII. SUMMARY
In this paper, we have considered a cyber insurance scheme
for mobile users. The MDP model has been proposed to
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Fig. 6. Average individual reward of two insurers with/without cooperation.
achieve the objective in which the insurer takes the reserve
state and the number of active users to derive an optimal
policy. We have also considered the situation that multiple
insurers can cooperate to share their reserve, cost, and reward.
The cooperation can help the cooperative insurers achieve
higher individual reward than that without the cooperation. For
the future work, we will consider coalition formation among
the insurers.
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